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INTRODUCTION 
The FTC has appointed itself as a roving data-security prosecutor—but, unlike other 
prosecutors, the FTC itself defines the elements of the offense and does so only after the fact.  
Worse, the FTC turns victims of cybercrime into defendants by bringing “case-by-case,” quasi-
criminal enforcement proceedings against companies like Wyndham, which responded to 
cyberattacks in a responsible fashion by alerting law enforcement, notifying consumers, retaining 
experts, and spending millions on remedial measures.  The FTC, however, is not letting the law or 
the facts get in the way of its data-security agenda.  The lesson for American businesses (large and 
small) is clear: do not expect the FTC to say what the rules are until after your business has been 
attacked, had data stolen, participated in an investigation, and been subjected to litigation. 
That theory of governmental power is fundamentally inconsistent with the principles of fair 
notice and due process that are at the core of our legal system.  If the rule of law means anything, it 
means the government must say in advance what the rules are before it tries to impose liability for 
breaking them.  “We know it when we see it” is not a lawful (or desirable) approach to agency 
regulation.  See Stegmaier, Psychics, Russian Roulette, and Data Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data 
Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673 (2013).  It is no answer to say, as the FTC does, 
that “reasonableness is the touchstone” of a Section 5 violation.  Opp. 17.  In the highly complex and 
technically sophisticated world of data security, a command to “act reasonably” provides no 
guidance as to how businesses must manage their systems, program their software, configure their 
servers, or make any of the other decisions involved in protecting computer networks from hackers. 
The FTC dismisses WHR’s objections as the complaints of a company that purportedly failed 
to “lock the doors of the store at night.”  Id. at 9.  The FTC knows better.  Hacking is an endemic, 
unavoidable problem in the modern world, as the scores of recent cyberattacks against private 
companies and government agencies show.  Public Citizen Br. at 4 (621 confirmed data breaches in 
2012 alone); GAO, Information Security (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/590
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/585570.pdf.  Subsequent to the attacks that victimized WHR, the FTC itself was attacked by 
cybercriminals, as was the FBI, CIA, and DOD.  Surely the FTC does not seriously argue that these 
agencies—not to mention Google, CitiBank, Sony, and scores of other sophisticated companies—are 
leaving their doors open to cybercriminals.  The way to help victims of cybercrime is not to 
empower the FTC to scour the country for “unreasonable” data-security practices, particularly when 
(as here) there is no evidence that consumers suffered economic harm from the attacks.  It is, as 
Congress and the President have recognized, to establish in advance clear data-security requirements 
by which companies should abide and to allow companies to share information without the chill of 
litigation.  Those ongoing efforts by the Executive and Legislative branches only confirm that 
Section 5, to the extent it even applies in the data-security context, provides no meaningful guidance 
as to what a business can do to comply with the law.   
I. THE COUNT II UNFAIRNESS CLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED 
A. The FTC’s Unfairness Authority Does Not Extend To Data Security 
The FTC, like any other federal agency, bears the burden of showing that Congress intended 
to delegate to it the specific authority it claims.  See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 
355, 374 (1986).  The FTC, however, points to no explicit grant of authority to regulate data security 
under Section 5.  Instead, it argues that “Congress deliberately delegated broad power to the FTC 
under Section 5” and points to other contexts in which the FTC has “use[d] … its unfairness 
provision.”  Opp. 11.  Those arguments fail for three reasons. See American Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 
F.3d 457, 468 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (FTC lacks authority to regulate attorneys under the GLB Act). 
First, the notion that Section 5 authorizes the FTC to act as a roving prosecutor of data 
security is “inconsistent with the intent that Congress has expressed … in the [data-security] specific 
legislation that it has enacted subsequent” to the FTC Act, which allocate specific data-security 
responsibilities to specific federal agencies in specific economic sectors.  FDA v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000).  Those statutes do much more than simply 
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provide the FTC with “new legal tools,” such as “rulemaking and/or civil penalty authority.” 1  Opp. 
12.  The FCRA, GLB Act, and COPPA contain detailed provisions explicitly authorizing the FTC to 
set substantive standards regarding data security, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681m(e)(1), 6804(a)(1)(C), 
6502(b), and to enforce those standards under Section 5 of the FTC Act, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681s(a), 
6805(a)(7), 6505(d).  Those provisions would have been entirely unnecessary if, as the FTC claims, 
Congress believed Section 5 already afforded the FTC such authority.  Congress’s limited delegation 
of data-security authority to other federal agencies likewise would make little sense if the FTC 
already enjoyed the broad data-security powers it claims.  See MTD at 9-10. 
Second, the FTC cannot run away from its previous admissions that it lacks jurisdiction over 
data security.  The FTC offers no response at all to an FTC official’s 2001 statement that “‘[t]he 
agency’s jurisdiction is (over) deception…. If a practice isn’t deceptive, we can’t prohibit them from 
collecting information.’”  Benner, FTC Powerless to Protect Privacy, Wired.  And although the 
Privacy Report observes that the “FTC Act prohibits unfair and deceptive practices,” the very same 
paragraph explains that, in the data-security context, the FTC is limited to its deception jurisdiction 
and “lacks authority to require firms to adopt information practice policies.”  2000 FTC Privacy 
Report at 37.  Nor can the FTC dismiss Chairman Pitofsky’s disavowal of regulatory authority as 
being limited to “online privacy.”  Opp. 14.  Chairman Pitofsky’s remarks applied to the “privacy 
and security of … personal information,” and called for legislation requiring entities “to take 
reasonable steps to protect the security and integrity of [personal] information.”  Consumer Privacy 
on the World Wide Web, 105th Cong. (July 21, 1998) (emphases added).  No such legislation would 
have been necessary if the Commission already had such authority under Section 5. 
 Third, the ongoing political debate about data-security regulation belies the notion that 
Congress intended the FTC to use Section 5 to set data-security standards.  Although it 
                                                 
1 The FTC already has rulemaking authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act.  See 15 USC § 57a(A). 
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acknowledges that debate, the FTC argues that Congress has acquiesced in FTC regulation through 
“inaction.”  Opp. 13, 17.  The Supreme Court, however, has often “expressed skepticism toward 
reading the tea leaves of Congressional inaction,” because what the FTC describes as “Congress’s 
deliberate acquiescence should more appropriately be called Congress’s failure to express any 
opinion.”  Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 749-50 (2006).  The Court has thus demanded 
“overwhelming evidence” that Congress “considered and rejected the precise issue presented before 
the Court” before it will rely on congressional silence.  Id. at 750 (emphases added).  There is no 
evidence—much less “overwhelming evidence”—that Congress specifically considered and 
approved the FTC’s use of Section 5 to impose data-security standards on the private sector.2 
Although the FTC suggests otherwise, Opp. 16-17, this Court owes no deference to the 
FTC’s newfound interpretation of Section 5 because the FTC has not engaged in formal adjudication 
or rulemaking.  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001); FCC v. Arlington, 2013 WL 
2149789, at *10 (S. Ct. 2013) (“Mead denied Chevron deference to action, by an agency with 
rulemaking authority, that was not rulemaking”).  And even if deference were appropriate, courts 
nevertheless should not hesitate to overturn “an agency’s expansive construction of the extent of its 
own power [which] would … [work] a fundamental change in the regulatory scheme.”  Id. at *9. 
B. The FTC Refuses To Give Fair Notice Of What The Law Requires 
Section 5 also does not permit the FTC to bring data-security enforcement actions without 
first publishing rules or regulations explaining in advance what parties must do to comply with the 
law.  Stegmaier, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673.  “A fundamental principle in our legal system is that 
laws which regulate persons or entities must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or 
                                                 
2 The FTC relies on four proposed bills and a single statement from a sponsor of one of those bills.  
Opp. 15-16.  None of those bills addressed, much less endorsed, the FTC’s claimed authority under 
Section 5.  And the “savings clauses” in those bills more sensibly refer to the FTC’s narrow 
delegations under the FCRA, GLBA, and COPPA.  Congress has also considered six other 
cybersecurity bills that included no language at all “preserving” data-security authority for the FTC.  
See S. 1151, S. 1408, S. 1434, S. 1535; S. 2105; H.R. 624. 
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required.”  FCC v. Fox Telev. Stations, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317 (2012).  The FTC’s approach—
which amounts to “we know a data-security violation when we see it”—is the opposite of fair notice.   
The Commission nonetheless asks the Court to overlook the absence of fair notice because, 
by the Commission’s telling, it is too difficult to specify in advance what data-security practices a 
company must adopt.  See Opp. 20.  But that only proves WHR’s point.  Providing fair notice to 
private citizens and businesses should matter more, not less, when the regulating agency itself 
struggles to separate lawful from unlawful conduct.  It is thus unsurprising that the Commission 
points to no case holding that the government can abandon its fair-notice obligations merely because 
it finds it challenging to articulate governing legal standards.  
In truth, however, the FTC overstates the difficulty it would encounter in providing advance 
notice.  The Commission has in the past issued data-security rules after notice-and-comment 
rulemaking in a number of discrete areas.  For example: 
• 16 C.F.R. Pt. 314 sets forth specific standards under the GLB Act “for developing, 
implementing, and maintaining reasonable” technical safeguards to protect consumer 
information. 16 C.F.R. § 314.1; see also id. § 314.4. 
• 16 C.F.R. Pt. 682 implements the FCRA by articulating specific guidelines regarding the 
proper destruction of consumer information.  See 16 C.F.R. § 682.3. 
There is no reason the FTC could not announce similar ex ante rules here—other than the FTC’s 
admission that it prefers the “regulatory flexibility” of employing a vague standard such as 
“reasonableness.”  Opp. 21.  But unchecked discretion is not a virtue of the FTC’s current approach 
to Section 5.  It is the very reason that such a regime cannot be lawful. 
When an agency tries to make new law through enforcement actions (as the FTC is doing 
here), it generally cannot simultaneously hold a party liable for violating the newly announced rule.  
See Gates & Fox Co. v. OSHRC, 790 F.2d 154, 156 (D.C. Cir. 1986).  Under Third Circuit law, it 
can do so only when the agency has previously stated with “ascertainable certainty” the standards it 
expects private parties to obey.  Dravo Corp. v. OSHRC, 613 F.2d 1227, 1233 (3d Cir. 1980). 
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The FTC’s proffered legal standard falls woefully short of the “ascertainable certainty” 
threshold.  In the Commission’s words, “reasonableness is the touchstone” of a data-security 
violation under Section 5: “unreasonable data security practices are unfair.”  Opp. 17.  But in the 
highly complex and sophisticated world of data security, a mere “reasonableness” standard provides 
no guidance at all.  Applying such a standard, there is no way WHR could know what software 
configurations it must employ, Am. Compl. ¶ 24(b), how it must set up firewalls, id. ¶ 24(a), what 
password complexity standards it must adopt, id. ¶ 24(f), how it must inventory computers 
connected to the network, ¶ 24(g), how it must program servers, id. ¶ 24(d), or how it must make any 
of the other decisions that go into implementing a data-security program. 
Conceding that “reasonableness” alone is not sufficient, the FTC argues that WHR could 
have consulted the FTC’s prior consent decrees. 3  Those consent orders, however, contain little more 
than highly abstract statements about the defendants’ data-security practices.  See, e.g., In the Matter 
of The TJX Companies, Inc., No. 072 3055, ¶ 8 (faulting TJX for not using “readily available” 
techniques to limit wireless access or “sufficient measures” to prevent unauthorized access); In the 
Matter of Guidance Software, Inc., No. 062 3057, ¶ 8 (faulting Guidance for not “adequately 
assess[ing]” the vulnerability of its network, using “readily available security measures,” or 
employing “sufficient measures” to detect unauthorized access); In the Matter of DSW Inc., No. 052 
3096 ¶ 7 (similar).  And, according to the complaints in those cases, it is only when each of the 
alleged data-security deficiencies are “taken together” that they become “unfair.”  See id.  The public 
is thus left to wonder which combination of vaguely identified deficiencies results in liability. 
                                                 
3 Private standards cannot provide the fair notice the FTC has refused to give.  Voluntary industry 
standards are not law and do not purport to reveal what the FTC (or any other entity) believes 
Section 5 to require.  See, e.g., Romero v. Buhimschi, 2007 WL 2902896 (E.D. Mich. 2007) 
(“Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the voluntary adoption of private standards of conduct 
creates a legal duty.”); Standards.org, PCI DSS (“PCI DSS is not law.”). 
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In any event, the Commission’s consent orders cannot substitute for an agency statement 
carrying the force of law.  As the FTC concedes, Opp. 19, its prior consent orders are not 
“controlling precedent for later Commission action” that in any way limit the FTC’s enforcement 
powers.  Beatrice Foods Co. v. FTC, 540 F.2d 303, 312 (7th Cir. 1976); Intergraph Corp. v. Intel 
Corp., 253 F.3d 695, 698 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[A] consent order does not establish illegal conduct.”).  
Statements that do not constrain governmental authority do not provide the fair notice that due 
process requires.  See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 63-64 (1999). 
The FTC attempts to excuse its failure to provide fair notice by drawing analogies between 
Section 5’s “unfairness” language and the good-faith-bargaining provision of the NLRA and the  
“General Duty Clause” in OSHA.  Opp. 23.  Unlike data-security regulation under Section 5, the 
duty to negotiate in good faith has a long-established meaning in contract law.  Katsiavrias v. 
Cendant Corp., 2009 WL 872172, at *6 (D.N.J. 2009); UCC § 1-201(20) (defining “good faith”).  
Similarly, there are over 30 years of concrete, specific agency guidelines specifying the obligations 
imposed by the General Duty Clause.  See Con Agra, Inc., 1983-84 O.S.H. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 26,420, at 
33, 523 (1983).  And even despite that guidance, courts have dismissed on fair-notice grounds 
numerous agency enforcement actions applying occupational-safety regulations that are far more 
specific than the General Duty Clause.  See, e.g., Fabi Constr. Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 508 F.3d 
1077, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Gates & Fox, 790 F.2d at 156; Dravo, 613 F.2d at 1232-33.4 
The FTC incorrectly asserts that it has no fair-notice obligation in this case because it is not 
seeking civil penalties.  But due process concerns do not evaporate merely because the agency is 
seeking disgorgement and highly burdensome injunctive relief in lieu of civil penalties.  See  UAW v. 
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 836-38 (1994).  To the contrary, courts frequently dismiss agency actions on 
                                                 
4 General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), is not a fair-notice case and, in any event, 
consent orders did not make the Supreme Court’s list of “informed judgment[s] to which courts and 
litigants may properly resort for guidance.”  Id. at 141-42. 
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fair notice grounds even when the agency is not seeking civil penalties or other punitive remedies.  
See United States v. Chrysler Corp. 158 F.3d 1350, 1355-56 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (car recall); In re 
Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (forfeiture); PMD Produce Brokerage v. USDA, 234 
F.3d 48, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (license revocation); Trinity Broad. v. FCC, 211 F.3d 618, 619 (D.C. 
Cir. 2000) (license renewal); Satellite Broad. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same). 
Under the FTC’s view, filing a data-security enforcement action is no burdensome task.  All 
the Commission need do is allege that a defendant acted “unreasonably” and make conclusory 
claims that the defendant failed to adopt “proper” or “adequate” technologies.  Because no rules or 
regulations exist cabining the FTC’s authority, no defendant could ever establish at the pleading 
stage that the FTC’s lawsuit contravened controlling law.  FTC data-security actions, in other words, 
would be exempted from Rule 12(b)(6) scrutiny. 
When WHR’s network was attacked in 2008, it had no fair notice of what network 
architecture, firewalls, inventory procedures, and incident-response plans the FTC believed Section 5 
required.  Even today the FTC still cannot (or will not) tell WHR what specific data-security rules it 
purportedly violated.  It is cold comfort to WHR (or other companies) that it will now have “an 
opportunity to represent to the finder of fact why it believes” its data-security practices met whatever 
data-security requirements the FTC announces during this litigation.  Opp. 22.  By announcing those 
requirements five years after WHR was attacked, the FTC denied WHR the opportunity to bring its 
data-security practices into line with the FTC’s views of Section 5 before being subject to suit. 
C. The FTC Has Not Alleged Substantial, Unavoidable Consumer Injury 
The FTC rests its consumer-injury argument on its allegation that the attacks, which involved 
payment card information only,  resulted in “$10.6 million in fraud loss.”  Am. Compl. ¶ 40.  But the 
complaint stops short of alleging that this loss was borne by consumers or was not reasonably 
avoidable by consumers—necessary preconditions for FTC jurisdiction.  That is because federal law 
and card-brand rules provide consumers with full reimbursement for unauthorized charges, MTD at 
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19-20, so the entire alleged loss either (i) was fully reimbursed to consumers; or (ii) could have been 
“reasonably avoid[ed]” by consumers by having their issuers rescind any unauthorized charges. 
This is not, as the FTC argues, a “fact issue[].”  Opp. 6.  Even accepting as true the FTC’s 
unsubstantiated allegation that some consumers might not have been reimbursed, id. at 8, federal law 
and card-brand zero-liability policies make clear that any such charges were nonetheless “reasonably 
avoidable” by consumers.  Moreover, the FTC’s claim that “federal law does not provide these same 
liability protections for debit cards” is flatly wrong.  Id.  As the FTC’s own website makes clear, 
federal regulations eliminate all consumer liability for unauthorized charges on debit cards, so long 
as the charges are reported within 60 days.  See 12 C.F.R. § 205.6(b)(3);  http://www.consum
er.ftc.gov//0213-lost-or-stolen-credit-atm-and-debit-cards. 
With its unreimbursed-fraud argument blocked, the FTC ultimately resorts to arguing that its 
complaint alleges injuries “other than unreimbursed fraud,” such as “frozen accounts” and “time and 
money resolving fraudulent charges.”  Opp. 5, 8.  But courts in data-security cases have routinely 
rejected such incremental and attenuated injuries as actionable consumer harm—even in cases that 
do not apply the high “substantial injury” bar set by the FTC Act.  See Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n v. FTC, 
767 F.2d 957, 973 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Randolph v. ING Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 486 F. Supp. 2d 
1, 8 (D.D.C. 2007).  Even the FTC has stated that the FTC Act, in most cases, requires concrete 
“monetary harm.”  In re Int’l Harvester, 1984 WL 565290, at *99 (FTC 1980).5  Nor do Reilly v. 
Ceridian, 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011) or Anderson v. Hannaford Brothers Co., 659 F.3d 151 (1st Cir. 
2011), support the FTC’s arguments.  The determinative factor in Reilly was that consumers’ “credit 
card statements [were] exactly the same today as they would have been had [the defendant’s] 
database never been hacked.”  664 F.3d at 45.  That is equally true here because federal law and 
                                                 
5 FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010), provides no support for the FTC.  Neovi held, 
unremarkably, that the withdrawal of $400 million from consumers’ accounts constituted 
“substantial” injury.  The Court did not hold, and had no occasion to hold, that non-economic, 
nuisance-type injuries were also “substantial” consumer injuries under the FTC Act. 
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card-brand policies eliminate any consumer liability for unauthorized transactions.  Hannaford arose 
solely under Maine law, 659 F.3d at 153-54, so the court had no opportunity to address whether such 
minor injury-avoidance costs constitute unavoidable “substantial injury” under the FTC Act. 
D. The FTC’s Unfairness Allegations Fail Federal Pleading Requirements 
Although the FTC claims that it “alleges with specificity” several data-security failures in 
paragraph 24 of its Amended Complaint, these purportedly “specific[]” allegations of liability boil 
down to vague claims of unreasonableness.  Opp. 4.  The addition of technical jargon surrounding 
these claims of unreasonableness does not change that the complaint’s allegations are nothing more 
than inadequate “legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  And despite expressing surprise at WHR’s causation argument, WHR’s 
alleged failure “to adequately inventory computers connected to [WHR’s] network” is the only 
action the Commission identifies as a potential cause of consumer injury.  Opp. 6.  That allegation, 
however, is unsupported by any facts explaining how WHR’s supposed inability to “physically 
locate” computers enabled hackers to exfiltrate payment card data. 
II. THE COUNT I DECEPTION CLAIM MUST BE DISMISSED 
The FTC’s attempt to salvage its deception claim is no more convincing.  The FTC insists 
that WHR’s privacy policy was “deceptive” because it misrepresented the state of data security at the 
Wyndham-branded hotels.  But the privacy policy does not make any representations about data 
security at the Wyndham-branded hotels—indeed, the policy expressly disclaims such 
representations.  See D.I. 91-3  at 5.  The FTC tries to overcome that disclaimer by arguing that “the 
data security failures … [at] the ‘Wyndham-branded hotels’ are actually data security failures on 
[WHR’s] own network” because WHR “permitted computers with unreasonable data security 
measures on its network.”  Opp. 27-28.  But the owner of one computer network does not assume 
responsibility for the data-security failures on another network merely by connecting to it—if that 
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were so, then any user that connected to the Internet would be on the hook for data-security failures 
of every other user on the internet.  The FTC’s “guilt by association” argument thus has no merit. 
 Nor can the FTC save its deception claim by arguing that WHR exercised “‘actual control’ 
over … [its] franchisees’ data security practices.”  Id. at 28.  The allegations in the complaint do not 
establish that WHR exercised the kind of “day-to-day” control that is necessary to assign vicarious 
liability to a franchisor.  Caprigilione v. Radisson Hotels Int’l., 2011 WL 4736310, at *3 (D.N.J. 
2011).  And even assuming that they did, the privacy policy disclaims responsibility for data-security 
practices at the hotels without regard to whether WHR actually controls those practices or not. 
The FTC insists that the Court must ignore the express disclaimer in WHR’s privacy policy 
because the “effectiveness of such a disclaimer is a fact-specific inquiry” that is “inappropriate for a 
motion to dismiss.”  Opp. 30.  But this is not a case in which a disclaimer is buried in fine print or 
otherwise obscured.  The disclaimer in WHR’s privacy policy is set forth in its own paragraph, with 
its own bold-face heading, using the same size and type of font used elsewhere in the document.  
Courts have relied on similar disclaimers to dismiss deception or fraud-based claims.  See, e.g., 
Pathfinder Mgmt., Inc. v. Mayne Pharma PTY, 2008 WL 3192563, at *16 (D.N.J. 2008); Eckler v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2012 WL 5382218, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 2012).  
The FTC cannot manufacture ambiguity in the express disclaimer by selectively quoting two 
snippets from the privacy policy out of context.  See Opp. 29.  The first quote relied on by the FTC 
merely restricts the geographic scope of the policy to “residents of the United States, hotels of our 
brands in the United States, and Loyalty Program activities in the United States.”  That language no 
more suggests that WHR is assuming responsibility for the data-security practices of “hotels” than it 
does that WHR is assuming responsibility for the data-security practices of “residents.”  The second 
quote merely states that WHR “recognizes the importance of … information collected about guests.”  
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The policy clearly explains, however, that it applies only to information that WHR “collect[s] about 
guests,” not to information that “[e]ach Franchisee collects” from guests.   
The FTC devotes only one sentence to defending the complaint’s conclusory allegations 
about WHR’s own data-security practices.  See Opp. 28.  Those bare legal assertions fall short of 
federal pleading requirements and should be disregarded on a motion to dismiss.  See Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  Although its deception claim hinges on proving that WHR’s data-
security practices were not “industry standard” or “commercially reasonable,” the FTC does not 
dispute that its complaint contains no allegations at all explaining what data-security practices were 
“standard” in the hospitality industry in 2008 or how WHR fell short of that benchmark. 
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